A Deep Learning Approach to Fast, Format-Agnostic Detection of Malicious
  Web Content by Saxe, Joshua et al.
A Deep Learning Approach to Fast, Format-Agnostic Detection of
Malicious Web Content
Joshua Saxe1, Richard Harang2, Cody Wild3, Hillary Sanders4
Abstract— Malicious web content is a serious problem on
the Internet today. In this paper we propose a deep learning
approach to detecting malevolent web pages. While past work
on web content detection has relied on syntactic parsing or
on emulation of HTML and Javascript to extract features, our
approach operates directly on a language-agnostic stream of
tokens extracted directly from static HTML files with a simple
regular expression. This makes it fast enough to operate in
high-frequency data contexts like firewalls and web proxies, and
allows it to avoid the attack surface exposure of complex parsing
and emulation code. Unlike well-known approaches such as
bag-of-words models, which ignore spatial information, our
neural network examines content at hierarchical spatial scales,
allowing our model to capture locality and yielding superior
accuracy compared to bag-of-words baselines. Our proposed
architecture achieves a 97.5% detection rate at a 0.1% false
positive rate, and classifies small-batched web pages at a rate
of over 100 per second on commodity hardware. The speed and
accuracy of our approach makes it appropriate for deployment
to endpoints, firewalls, and web proxies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malicious web content is a major element in cyber-
attacks observed today. This harmful content comes in two
categories. The first category involves attacker-crafted web
content that exploits browser software vulnerabilities to
achieve malicious ends on users computers. The second
category, phishing, targets human fallibility, and consists of
web content that tricks users into inadvertently divulging
financial information or login credentials. Attacks leveraging
malicious content are highly prevalent on today’s web. For
example, in one week in December 2017, more than 100,000
previously unseen malicious HTML files were observed on
a threat intelligence aggregator.
There are multiple challenges to detecting and blocking
this kind of content. First, detection approaches must operate
quickly on the commodity hardware used in user endpoints
and firewalls, so that they do not slow down users’ browsing
experience. Second, approaches must be resilient to syntactic
and semantic changes in malicious web content, so that
adversarial evasion techniques like Javascript obfuscation
and text randomization do not fly under the radar. Finally,
detection approaches must be able to find needles in the
haystack: small snippets of code embedded in otherwise
benign web content, which indicate that a page is dangerous.
This is important because many of today’s web attacks
are delivered via ad networks or comment feeds as small
components of otherwise benign webpages.
To address these challenges, this paper proposes a deep
learning approach to detecting malicious web content. Our
*This research was conducted at Sophos
1 joshua.saxe at sophos.com
2 richard.harang at sophos.com
3 cody.wild at sophos.com
4 hillary.sanders at sophos.com
model uses a simple, fast, 12 character regular expression
to tokenize web content, and then examines this content
at multiple hierarchical spatial scales. “Hierarchical spatial
scales” here means that instead of simply using token ag-
gregation over the full document as an input, we calculate
representations that aggregate over multiple locally specific
subregions: dividing the document into halves, quarters,
eights, and sixteenths. We then apply two dense layers
- which we refer to as the inspector network - over all
these levels of aggregation to extract a representation of the
document at these multiple spatial scales.
We compare our proposed approach to a number of
baselines, including simple bag-of-words models and more
complex deep architectures, and show that it achieves the
best results at a reasonable computational cost. We achieve
a detection rate of more than 97% at a false positive rate
of 0.1% on temporally disjoint, previously unseen content,
without the extra complexity of parsing of web content
or emulating its behavior. Indeed, our results suggest that
malicious content detection models utilizing deep learning
can learn high quality representations of web content based
on a simple stream-of-tokens input.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In
section II we review related work in the areas of malicious
HTML, Javascript and URL detection, as well as related
work in deep learning and natural language processing
literature. In section III we lay the groundwork intuitions
for our hierarchical architecture choice, and describe how it
works on a mechanical level. Subsequently, in VI we describe
our experimental setup, detail the experiments we ran, and
provide analysis of our experimental results.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Our work relates to research in the areas of heuristic web
content detection, machine learning web content detection,
and deep learning document classification. Below we review
this work and place it in dialogue with our own.
One body of web detection work focuses solely on using
URL strings to detect malicious web content. [1] proposes
a machine learning system for detecting malicious URLs.
They focus on using manually defined features to maximize
detection accuracy. [2] also focuses on detecting malicious
web content based on URLs, but whereas the first of these
uses a manual feature engineering based approach, the sec-
ond shows that learning features from raw data with a deep
neural network achieves better performance. [3] uses URLs
as a detection signal, but also incorporates other information,
such as URL referrers within web links, to extract hand-
crafted features which they provide as input to both SVM
and K-nearest neighbors classifiers.
All of these approaches share a common goal with our
work, the detection of malicious web content, but because
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they focus only on URLs and related information, they
are unable to take advantage of the malicious semantics
within the web content. While URL-based systems have
the advantage of being lightweight and can be deployed
in contexts where full web content is not available, our
work focuses on HTML files because their richer structure
and higher information content. Since these approaches use
orthogonal input information, there is certainly room for
HTML-based and URL-based approaches to be combined
into an even more effective ensemble system.
A body of work including [4], [5], [6] and [7] attempts to
detect malicious web content by manually extracting features
from HTML and Javascript, and feeding them into either a
machine learning or heuristic detection system. [4] proposes
an approach that extracts a wide variety of features from a
page’s HTML and Javascript static content, and then feeds
this information to machine learning algorithms. They try
several combinations of features and learning algorithms and
compare their relative merits. [5] eschews machine learning
and proposes manually-defined heuristics to detect malicious
HTML, also based on its static features. [6] also utilizes
a heuristic-based system, but one which leverages both a
Javascript emulator and HTML parser to extract high quality
features. Similarly, [7] proposes a web crawler with an
embedded Javascript engine for Javascript deobfuscation and
analysis to support detection of malicious content.
The approach we propose here is similar to these efforts
in that we focus on detailed analysis of HTML files, which
include HTML, CSS, and embedded Javascript. Our work
differs in that instead of parsing HTML, Javascript or CSS
explicitly, or emulating Javascript, we use a parser-free
tokenization approach to compute a representation of HTML
files. A parser-free representation of web content allows us
to make a minimal number of assumptions about the syntax
and semantics of malicious and benign documents, thereby
allowing our deep learning model maximum flexibility in
learning an internal representation of web content. Addi-
tionally, this approach minimizes the exposed attack surface
and computational cost of complex feature extraction and
emulation code.
Outside of the web content detection literature, researchers
have made wide-ranging contributions in the area of deep
learning based text classification. For example, in a notable
work, [8] shows that 1-dimensional convolutional neural
networks, using sequences of both unsupervised (word2vec)
and fine-tuned word embeddings, give good or first-rank
performance against a number of standard baselines in the
context of sentence classification tasks. [9] goes beyond
this work to show that CNNs that learn representations
directly from character inputs perform competitively relative
to other document classification approaches on a range of
text classification problems. Relatedly, [8] proposes a model
that combines word and character-level inputs to perform
sentence sentiment classification.
Our work relates to these approaches in that, because
our model uses a set of dense network layers that apply
the same parameters over multiple subdivisions of a file’s
tokens, it can be interpreted as a convolutional neural net-
work that operates over text. One difference between our
work and the work cited above is that we do not operate
on natural language exclusively. Instead, our architecture
operates on HTML documents that are, in practice, a mash-
up of HTML, Javascript, and CSS, with arbitrary source
code, attack payloads, and natural language expressed within
these formats. Because in-the-wild HTML content makes
defining a discrete vocabulary of tokens difficult, we do not
use word embeddings as our model input. Instead we use
a novel hierarchical representation of web documents based
on simple, format-agnostic tokenization.
Also, unlike some of the past work on deep learning based
document classification, we avoid using raw character se-
quences as input to our model. We do this because the length
of typical HTML documents makes inference involving con-
volutions or recurrent architectures over raw character strings
intractable on today’s commodity endpoints and firewalls.
Our work also differs from most document classification
work in that we seek to detect an active adversary attempting
to evade detection (in contrast to, for example, sentiment
classification, in which sentence authors do not seek to evade
detection of the sentiments they express).
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Intuitions and design principles
A number of intuitions, which we list below, motivate the
model we propose in this paper:
1) Malicious web pages often have small snippets of
malicious content (such as malicious Javascript) em-
bedded in some variable amount of benign content
(e.g. the original benign content in a hacked webpage).
Identifying that a given document is malicious thus
requires that a model examine the document at multiple
spatial scales. That is because the range of sizes of
malicious Javascript snippets is small, but the variance
in length of HTML documents is quite large, meaning
that proportion of the document length that represents
malicious content is variable among examples.
2) Explicit parsing of HTML documents, which in reality
are collections of HTML, Javascript, CSS, and raw
data, is undesirable, because it significantly compli-
cates implementation, can require high computational
overhead, and opens up an attack surface within the
detector itself which could potentially be exploited by
attackers.
3) Emulation, static analysis, or symbolic execution of
Javascript within HTML documents is undesirable
because of the computational overhead it imposes and
because of the attack surface it opens up within the
detector.
Following from these intuitions, we made the following
high level design decisions in creating our proposed ap-
proach:
1) Instead of performing detailed parsing, static anal-
ysis, symbolic execution, or emulation of content
within HTML documents, we compute a simple bag-
of-words-style tokenization of documents that makes
minimal assumptions about their constituent formats.
2) Instead of simply using a flat, bag-of-tokens represen-
tation aggregated over the entire document, we use a
representation that captures locality at multiple spatial
scales representing different levels of localization and
aggregation, allowing our model to find needle-in-the-
haystack malicious content within otherwise benign
malicious documents.
B. Approach
Our approach involves a feature extractor, which parses
out a sequence of tokens from HTML documents, and a
neural network model, which makes classification decisions
by using a shared-weight examination of the features at hier-
archical levels of aggregation. The neural network includes
two logical components:
• The first component is an inspector, which applies
weights at hierarchical spatial scales and aggregates
information about the document into a 1024-length
vector.
• The second component is a master network which uses
the output of the inspector network to make a final
classification decision.
The inspector and master components of the network are
optimized jointly through back-propagation. Below we walk
through how each of these logical components contribute to
our overall system.
Feature extraction: Our system’s workflow begins by
extracting a sequence of character-string tokens from HTML
files. First we tokenize the target document with the follow-
ing regular expression: ([ˆ\x00-\x7F]+|\w+), which
splits the document along non-alphanumeric word bound-
aries. Then we divide the token stream up into 16 sequential
chunks of equal length - where length is defined as number
of tokens - including fewer tokens in the last chunk if the
number of tokens in the documents is not divisible by 16. A
reference implementation of the tokenization and chunking
function is given as Python code in the Appendix of this
paper under the heading TokenizeChunk.
Next we use a modified version of the hashing trick,
with 1024 bins, to create a bag-of-words style representation
for each chunk. We use a technique introduced in [10] to
modify bin placement so that it’s a function both of feature
hash and token length (a Python reference implementation
is given as TokenLengthHash in the Appendix). The result
of this workflow, in which we tokenize, and then divide into
16 equal length token chunks, and then feature hash each
token chunk into 1024 bins, is a 16x1024 tensor representing
a sequence of bags-of-tokens extracted from an HTML
document, where each element in the sequence represents
an aggregation over a contiguous 116 of the input document.
Inspector: Once we have a feature representation for
an HTML document, we input that representation into our
neural network, which we depict in Figure 1. As shown
in the Figure, the first step in our computational flow is
to create a hierarchical representation of our sequence of
bags of tokens, in which we collapse our initial 16 bags
of tokens into 8 bags of tokens, collapse these 8 bags of
tokens into 4, those 4 into 2, and those 2 into 1, such that
we obtain multiple bag-of-tokens representations capturing
token occurrences at multiple spatial scales. This collapsing
process works by averaging windows of length 2 and step
size 2 over the original 16 bags of tokens, and then doing
this recursively until we get to a single bag of tokens. An
important distinction to note here is that, by averaging, rather
than summing, the token counts, we keep the norm of each
Fig. 1. The architecture of our proposed hierarchical inspector approach
representational level the same within a given document
(though it can vary between documents of different overall
length).
Once the inspector has created this hierarchical representa-
tion, it proceeds to visit each node in the tree of aggregations
and compute an output vector. As shown in Figure 1, the
inspector is a feed forward neural network with two fully
connected layers which each have 1024 ReLU units. We use
layer normalization [11] to guard against vanishing gradients
and dropout [12] to regularize the inspector. We use a dropout
rate of 0.2.
To compute a 1024-dimensional vector output from the
inspector after it has visited each node, we take the maximum
activation from each of its 1024 output neurons across the
31 outputs produced from the 31 aggregated chunks. This
causes the final vector representation of the document to be
the maximum output of each neuron in the final layer of the
inspector, given all of its activations over all nodes in the
hierarchy. Intuitively, this should promote the output vector
capturing patterns that most closely match known template
features useful in predicting malicious content, regardless of
where they appear in the document, or how long the overall
document is.
Master: Once the inspector has computed its 1024-
dimensional output vector over the target document, this
vector is input into the master component of our model.
As shown in Figure 1, the master is implemented as a
feed forward neural network with two logical fully-connected
blocks, where each fully connected layer is preceded by layer
normalization and dropout. As in the case of the inspector,
here we use a dropout rate of 0.2.
The final layer of the model consists of 26 sigmoid units
corresponding to 26 detection decisions we make about
documents. One of these sigmoids is devoted to determining
if the target document is malicious or benign. The other 25
sigmoids detect a variety of informative tags, such as whether
the document is a phishing document or an instance of an
exploit kit. To train the model, we use binary cross-entropy
loss on each of these sigmoid outputs and then average the
resulting gradients to compute parameter updates. In this
paper, we emphasize evaluating the accuracy of the good
vs. bad sigmoid output, but touch on our performance on
these other outputs below as well.
IV. EVALUATION
We tested our approach in two ways. First, we compared it
to a number of bag-of-words style baselines which represent
a standard document classification approaches. Second, we
modified the architecture in a variety of ways to test whether
our model design choices were contributing to improved
accuracy. We did not directly compare our approach to
approaches that involve complex parsing of or emulation
of web content, because the performance overhead of these
approaches placee them out of scope of our research goals,
which were to create a fast web content detection model
that can operate on web content observed on firewalls and
endpoints.
Below we describe our experimental dataset, our baselines,
and our model modifications and then introduce and discuss
our results.
Fig. 2. A time histogram showing when the samples in our training and
validation sets were first seen on VirusTotal
Experimental dataset and evaluation approach : We tested
our approach on data collected from the threat intelligence
site VirusTotal. VirusTotal receives tens of thousands of new
HTML files per day, scanning them with 60 web threat
scanners from dozens of security vendors. Sophos subscribes
to VirusTotal’s paid threat intelligence service, and as part
of this subscription we receive every HTML file submitted
to VirusTotal with its corresponding scanner results. The
experimental dataset used in this paper was collected from
the VirusTotal feed in the first 10 months of 2017, as shown
in Figure 2.
Files were uniquely identified based on SHA256, and our
training/testing splits were computed on the basis of the time
that the file was first reported on VirusTotal. This process
ensures that a) our training and test sets are distinct (as a later
submission of an identical HTML file would be interpreted as
a resubmission of that file, and we would ignore it in favor
of the earlier version) and b) that our training and testing
procedure at least approximates a real-world deployment
scenario, as discussed in more detail below.
Our labeling strategy is to use the scanner ensemble’s
response to a given file as the input to a labeling rule,
which derives binary good versus bad labels from these data.
Specifically, our labeling rule defines benign HTML files
as files receiving 0 detections from security vendors, and
malicious files as files receiving 3 or more detections.
Additionally, we discard files that received 1 or 2 detec-
tions and did not use them in our research, because we
consider this small number of detections to mean that the
security industry is still uncertain as to whether they are
malicious or benign. As can be seen in Figure 2, these
indeterminate files represent a very small proportion of the
overall files from this time period.
This labeling approach carries the risk that our approach
will simply memorize the knowledge of security vendor
products, as opposed to learning truly novel detection ca-
pabilities that detect malware the vendor community would
have missed. In this work, we test this using a historical
simulation procedure, defined as follows:
1) We train our models on web content files first seen in
the VirusTotal feed before some time t.
2) We evaluate our models on web content files first seen
in the two months after time t, using the latest vendor
labels.
This evaluation procedure mitigates the problem of assess-
ing our ability to detect malicious web content the vendor
community would have missed. This is because we test on
files we haven’t seen in training, but which the security
vendor community has time to catch up to through detection
rule and blacklist updates, thereby simulating the problem of
detecting 0-day malicious content.
In other words, insofar as a machine learning model is able
to correctly predict the label of future web content the vendor
community has had time to blacklist or write detection rules
for, we believe there is at least circumstantial evidence that
our approach also has the ability to detect malicious web
content the vendor community can be expected to miss
entirely.
To provide more direct evidence of the efficacy of our
proposed approach, we also hand-inspected samples that
our labeling strategy marked as benign but for which our
proposed model assigned a high probability of maliciousness,
finding that a majority of these supposed false positives were
either clearly malicious or junk content. We discuss these
results below.
V. EXPERIMENTS
Aside from evaluating our proposed model, we conducted
five additional experiments, three of which test the efficacy of
our approach against alternative models, and two of which
explore the inner workings of our model. To test the effi-
cacy of our model architecture we conducted the following
three experiments. For all neural network models, models
were trained using the Adam optimization scheme, balanced
batches of size 64, and early stopping based on validation
set performance. We enumerate our test approaches below:
LR-BoT: Elastic Net regularized logistic regression on bag
of token features. Here we used the tokens we extract for
our full model, but feature hash them into a 16284-length
vector. We chose to use a 16284 input in this and other
baseline experiments since it is the same dimensionality as
the 16x1024 representation we use in our proposed model,
and thus approximates an apples-to-apples comparison. The
LR-BoT test model provides a straightforward bag-of-tokens
linear document classification approach as a point of com-
parison. We determined the λ1 and λ2 parameters for the L1
and L2 penalties via grid search.
FF-BoT: A feed-forward architecture using the 16284-
length feature hashed bag of tokens feature representation
used above. This test model provides a straightforward deep
learning bag-of-words baseline as a point of comparison with
our proposed approach.
XGBoost-BoT: A gradient boosted decision tree (XG-
Boost) model using the same feature input as FF-BoT.
Separate from our baseline experiments, we performed
several architecture modifications to determine the contri-
bution of the design decisions we made in creating our
proposed model, which we list here:
FlatSequential: A variant of our proposed model with the
average pooling step removed, such that the inspector only
sees the leaf nodes of the tree. Put another way, out of the
31 aggregated representations input to the champion model,
Fig. 3. ROC curves showing the performance of our model versus two
bag-of-tokens style baselines
Fig. 4. ROC curves showing the performance of our model versus two
modified models
this model only sees the 16 sequential chunks, and none of
the larger aggregated windows. This model tests the gain
in performance provided by examining HTML documents at
hierarchical spatial scales.
FlattenedFF: A simple feed forward neural network that
uses the same feature representation as our selected model.
However, rather than applying the shared-weight inspector at
each step, we simply rasterize the 16x1024 sequential bag of
tokens vectors into a single, 16284-length vector and input
that into a feed forward neural network. This experiment
evaluates the performance gain of using a shared-weight
inspector at all, relative to a dense first layer.
VI. RESULTS
Figures ?? and 4 give our experimental results as ROC
(receiver operating characteristic) curves, which show the
trade-off between true positive rate (y-axis) and false positive
rate (x-axis) as we adjust our detection threshold. Figure 3
compares our baselines, FF-BoT and XGBoost-BoT, with our
proposed approach, and Figure 4 compares our architecture
modifications with our proposed approach. Excluded from
TABLE I
DETECTION RATES FOR DIFFERENT MALWARE FAMILIES, AS WELL AS
THE PERCENTAGE OF MALWARE SAMPLES IN WHICH THAT TAG APPEARS
Family Category DR@10e-3 Prevalence (%)
Code Injection XSS 0.999 16.1
Browser Exploit 0.998 14.4
iFrame Mischief 0.998 14.9
Malicious Browser Redirect 0.997 3.3
Blackhat SEO 0.995 49.6
Ramnit Malware Family 0.995 39.7
Fake JQuery 0.977 .5
All Malware 0.972 100
Facebook Hacking 0.971 13.8
Changes Browser Startpage 0.937 5.2
Ransomware 0.931 1.2
Auto Click 0.902 .6
Phishing 0.895 .5
these figures is our linear baseline experiment, LR-BoT,
which achieved a dramatically worse result than the rest
of our experiments (i.e. 10% detection rate at a 0.1% false
positive rate).
Inspecting the ROC curves in Figure 3, we see that our
proposed approach outperforms our baseline models. If we
compare these models’ relative performance at a fixed false
positive rate of 0.1%, we see that our proposed approach,
FF-BoT, and XGBoost-BoT achieve detection rates 97.2%,
95.2%, and 95.4% respectively. Posed in terms of false
negative rates, our approach achieves a false negative rate of
2.8% whereas our baselines’ false negative rates are roughly
double that, at 4.8% and 4.6%. It is also worth noting that the
overall ROC curve for our proposed model is significantly
better than that of our baselines.
Interestingly, our FF-BoT baseline, which underperforms
relative to our proposed model, has far more parameters
(about 20 million) than our proposed model (about 4 mil-
lion). This suggests that our proposed approach captures a far
more efficient representation of malicious HTML documents,
thanks to the fact that our inspector uses the same parameters
over every spatial context it examines in our hierarchical
representation.
Inspecting the ROC curves in Figure 4, we see that
both the hierarchical inspector approach, in which a feed
forward block is applied, with shared weights to each node
in our bag of tokens hierarchy, outperforms variations on
this architecture. FlattenedFF, which inspects our sequential
bag-of-tokens representation with separate weights for each
chunk achieves a 93.4% detection rate, and FlatSequential,
which is identical to our proposed model but without the
average pooling step, achieves a 93.4% detection rate as well.
Additionally the overall ROC curves for the test models are
significantly worse than for our proposed approach.
The fact that our proposed approach beats FlatSequential is
interesting, because it shows that inspecting content at mul-
tiple spatial scales is essential to achieving good accuracy.
Similarly, our approach beating FlattenedFF demonstrates
that our inspector’s usage of the same parameters upon
inspection of every spatial context and scale is essential
to yielding high detection accuracy, since FlattenedFF uses
separate weights for every spatial context and achieves a
worse result.
To get a better understanding of what our model learned,
we took the malware family tags - earlier used as auxiliary
targets - and subdivided true malware samples up according
to which tags were attached to them. Based on a threshold
corresponding to a 10e-3 global false positive rate, we
calculated the overall detection rate - 97.2% - and compared
that to the detection rate for malware tagged as each of
our most prevalent families. This comparison, shown in
Table I, demonstrates that our final model had the highest
success with code injection, browser exploit, and iFrame
manipulation attacks, and had the most trouble with phishing
websites. A note about the percentages in the prevalance
table: these tags are not mutually exclusive, which is why
the prevalance rates do not add up to 100.
In addition to large scale validation, we also checked to see
whether or not cases where our model disagreed with vendor-
based labels proved that our model had actually detected
unknown malicious web content that the security community
missed. To do this analysis we inspected the top 20 highest
scoring test examples from our validation set that the vendor
community unanimously marked as benign, and found that
13 of the 20 were in fact malicious or potentially unwanted,
and 7 of them were false positives. Of the examples that
we found were malicious, 3 were the alarm pages from web
content blockers, not malicious themselves but which indi-
cate maliciousness, 3 were malicious fake JQuery libraries,
1 was Javascript that drops a fake svchost.exe file on disk,
1 was a Facebook clickjacking page, 1 contained code to
perform a drive-by-download, and 2 were Viagra spam. This
analysis verifies that our model is capable of generalizing
beyond label noise and identifying previously unidentified
malicious content.
VII. CONCLUSION
One consistent theme in the recent successes of applied
deep learning has been the value of using known structural
features of a domain - such as locality-based features and
translational invariance in the case of images - to channel
and constrain a model’s learning ability in the direction of
that known structure. While this paper’s domain is more
specialized, it continues in that same tradition of using
domain knowledge to provide the useful inductive bias of
hierarchical spatial scaling, which we believe makes our
model more effective at handling detection problems within
documents of potentially widely-varying size. In this paper,
we achieve strong performance of 97.5% detection at a
0.1% false positive, and even identify malicious content not
previously caught by the vendor community, with a purely
token-based static approach that avoids the need for complex
parsing or emulation systems. This result gives us greater
confidence that deep learning systems can learn high quality
internal representations of fairly raw web content inputs that
outperform hand-crafted features, and, more broadly, that
deep learning approaches have a promising future in the
detection of malicious web content.
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APPENDIX
Here we provide short Python reference implementations
of the functions that produce the input to our proposed
architecture, including TokenizeChunk, which tokenizes a
target web document and splits it into chunks, and Token-
LengthHash, which creates feature vectors using a modified
version of the hashing trick for each of these chunks.
TokenizeLengthHash
import re
import murmur # the murmur hashing library
def TokenizeLengthHash(data, steps=16, dims=16384):
feats = re.findall(r"([ˆ\x00-\x7F]+|\w+)", data)
final_feats = []
for feat in feats:
loglength = int(min(8, max(1, math.log(len(feat), 1.4)))) - 1 # 0-7
shash = murmur.string_hash(feat) % (dims / steps / 8)
final_feats.append(loglength * (dims / steps / 8) + shash)
return final_feats
TokenizeChunk
import numpy as np
def TokenizeChunk(data, steps=16, dims=16384):
data = TokenizeLengthHash(data, steps=steps, dims=dims)
ret = []
stepsize = int(len(data) / float(steps))
for percent in np.arange(0, 1, 1 / float(steps)):
idx = int(len(data) * percent)
unq, cnt = np.unique(data[idx:idx + stepsize], return_counts=True)
newarray = np.zeros(dims / steps)
for v, c in zip(unq, cnt):
newarray[v] = c
ret.append(newarray)
return ret
